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Alden v. Maine: Protecting the States at the Expense of
the People
The jurisdiction of the Court, then, being extended by the letter of the
constitution to all cases arising under it, or under the laws of the United
States, it follows that those who would withdraw any case of this
description from thatjurisdiction, must sustain the exemption they claim
on the spirit and true meaning of the constitution, which spirit and true
meaning must be so apparent as to overrule the words which its framers
'have employed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Alden v. Maine2 presented the Supreme Court with a constitutional
question of first impression. There, probation officers filed suit in
federal court against their employer, the state of Maine, under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA") alleging the State had
violated the Act's overtime provisions. The United States District Court
for the District of Maine dismissed the suit on the basis of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida. Petitioners
refiled their suit in state court. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action on the grounds that the
provision of the FLSA that authorized private suits against a state in its
own courts violated the principle of sovereign immunity. The Supreme
Court affirmed in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy holding that
the Eleventh Amendment4 merely confirmed the principle of sovereign
immunity that was implicit in the Constitution. Although earlier
Eleventh Amendment cases5 rendered the result in Alden predictable,
1. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 185, 116 S. Ct. 1114,
1185 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (Wheat.)
264, 379-80 (1821)).
2. 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
3. 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). The Court held Article I did not grant
Congress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suits
commenced or prosecuted in the federal courts. Seminole Tribe involved a suit by
the Seminole Indian Tribe against Florida. The Tribe alleged that the state had
violated the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3). 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) explicitly authorized suits in
federal court to force state compliance.
4. The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.
5. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 10 S. Ct. 509 (1890);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S.
516, 19 S. Ct. 269 (1899); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 20 S. Ct. 919 (1900); In
re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S. Ct. 588 (1921); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of
Treas. of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 65 S. Ct. 347 (1945); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S. Ct. 2666
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the Court stepped beyond Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by
asserting that sovereign immunity found its basis not in that
Amendment, but in the structure and history of the Constitution and
the Tenth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
examined the debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitution
and adoption of the Bill of Rights, pre-Constitution state law,
writings of members of the founding generation, and prior Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court concluded that the founding
generation did not contemplate state suability in their scheme of
federalism, asserting that sovereign immunity had always been a part
of the American consciousness. In doing so, the Court relied on a
literal interpretation of some of the founders' words, but ignored the
evolutionary nature of American government envisioned by those
men. This reliance on federalism to support the right of state
sovereign immunity was a misapplication of modern and, arguably,
1787 concepts of federalism.
The Founders sought to create a system that would permit
Congressional action to promote unity, while considering the
people's fears of an overreaching central government.6 By 1787
many citizens recognized the need for a central national authority to
prevent states from destroying the Articles of Confederation.7
Accordingly, certain powers were ceded to the federal government in
order to insure stability and security, both of which had been lacking
under the Articles of Confederation.! By permitting the states to
invoke the right of sovereign immunity through the structure and
(1976); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S. Ct. 3142
(1985); Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 110 S. Ct.
1868 (1990); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996).
6. Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89, at 124-28 (1992).
The Articles of Confederation provided Congress with sufficient authority
throughout the Revolutionary War. However, the states' unwillingness to follow
Congress once the British threat ceased caused Congress to weaken. State
governments competed against each other and blatantly ignored the Articles of
Confederation. Id. Some examples of state rebellion involved the violation of the
national government's treaties with foreign countries, the building of individual
state navies, state wars against the Native Americans, and most harmful to the
country's interest, the failure to comply with congressional requisitions. Id.
7. James Wilson, who would later write with the majority in Chisholm v.
Georgia, recognized the necessity of unity, stating:The tables at length began to
turn. No sooner were the State Governments formed than their jealousy and
ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavored to cut a slice from the
common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation became
frittered down to the impotent condition in which it now stands. Id. at 127.
8. Shay's rebellion stands as the most striking example of the problems under
the Articles of Confederation where Revolutionary War veterans formed small
armies to prevent the collection of debts. 1 Alan Brinkley, et al., American History:
A Survey 159-60 (8th ed. 1991).
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history of the Constitution, the Alden Court undermined the concept
of federalism because state sovereign immunity ultimately permits
states to ignore the federal government in federal issues, and leaves
individuals unprotected.
The Alden majority provides only one side of the constitutional
debate on state sovereign immunity. The true intentions of the
founders are ultimately impossible to discern,9 but their ideas on
sovereign immunity serve a vital purpose in interpreting the meaning
behind the words of the Constitution. The Court, looking only to the
words of a few men from the founding generation, ignored the
fundamental purpose of the Constitution. The object of the
Constitution was not the protection of states, but the protection of
individuals. The federal system served to protect the people from any
government becoming too strong. The Court ignored the sovereignty
of the people in Alden by crafting a view of federalism in which more
rights are accorded to the states than to the citizens.
The majority opinion presents a flawed interpretation of history
as reliance on authorities cited by the majority permits the conclusion
that opinions differed as to the existence of state sovereign immunity.
Also, even if state sovereign immunity could definitively be found to
exist in 1787, this does not mean state sovereign immunity is
compatible with today's form of government. The government has
changed since 1787, even the founding generation recognized the
fluidity of the Constitution, and, by relying on their interpretation of
events over two centuries ago, the Alden majority departs from the
modem scheme of government.
Section two of this paper examines the reasoning of the majority
and dissenting opinions inAlden. An analysis of the historical nature
of federalism comprises the third section. The fourth section consists
of an analysis of the change in the balance of government
precipitated by the Civil War. The final part of the paper examines
Alden 's implications on the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth
Amendment, as well as the case's practical consequences.
II. ALDEN V. MAINE
A. The Majority
The Court begins its analysis by examining the understanding of
sovereign immunity at the time of ratification. According to Justice
Kennedy, the states did not surrender the right of sovereign
immunity upon entering the Union because it had existed in state
9. John V. Orth, History and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1147, 1157 (2000).
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constitutions throughout the period of revolution and under the
Articles of Confederation."° To support this contention, the Court
argued that the right of sovereign immunity remained with the states
because the Constitution reserved to the states a "substantial portion
of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and
essential attributes inhering in that status."" Although the
Constitution delegated certain matters to the national government,
the founding generation intended to create a "system in which the
State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority
over the people-who were. .. 'the only proper objects of
government.""'' 2 Because the states remained sovereign, they
retained their right to immunity from suits by citizens and other
states.'
3
The right of sovereign immunity originated in English common
law. Under common law principles a suit could not be brought
against the sovereign unless the Crown consented. The King could
never be sued in any court because he was sovereign over all.
Lower vassals could, however, be subjected to suits by higher
sovereigns. Thus, in British history, the King as sovereign could
never be brought into court, nor could suits be instituted against
lords in their own courts, but suits could be brought against people
in courts where they were subjects, not sovereigns. 4 The majority
urged that the states universally accepted this British practice, and
as such did not understand the Constitution to remove state
sovereign immunity.'5
The American Revolution and the heavy debts incurred by the
states during those years made state sovereign immunity a concern of
state legislatures.' 6 The states wanted to insure they would not have
to defend themselves against creditors, because such claims would
lead to ruination and insolvency. 7 The Alden Court relied on the
words of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall.
Hamilton wrote that suits could not be commenced against a
10. 527 U.S. 706, 713, 715-19, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246-50 (1999).
11. Id. at 714, 119 S. Ct. at 2247.
12. Id.
13. The Court also relied on the language of the Tenth Amendment to support
its contention that the right of sovereign immunity remained with the state as "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id. at 739,
119 S. Ct. at 2259; U.S. Const. amend. X.
14. 527 U.S. at 741-42, 119 S. Ct. at 2260; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,415,
99 S. Ct. 1182, 1185 (1979) ("The King's immunity rested primarily on the
structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the King could do
no wrong").
15. 527 U.S. at 715-16, 119 S. Ct. at 2248.
16. Id. at716, 119 S. Ct. at2248.
17. Id.
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sovereign without its consent, and because the states did not cede
such power at the Constitutional Convention, it still existed.' 8
Madison and Marshall voiced this same idea at the Virginia
Convention. 9 Because the retention of the right of sovereign
immunity served the states' financial interests, there existed a valid
basis for the argument in favor of state sovereign immunity.
The Alden Court also examined prior Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence in order to support its contention that sovereign
immunity existed implicitly within the structure and understanding
of the Constitution. The Court had repeatedly rejected the argument
that the authors of the Eleventh Amendment intended it to be applied
literally, narrowing the scope of subject matter jurisdiction by
amending Article 111.20 Just over one hundred years ago, the Court in
Hans v. Louisiana21 settled the issue of state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. By ignoring the literal language of
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment, the Hans Court held that
sovereign immunity prevented a suit by a citizen against his own
state. In the opinion of the Hans Court, rejecting sovereign immunity
would have strained the "Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of."22
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions adhered to this general
understanding that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to
overturn the decision of Chisholm v. Georgia" and clarify the
principle that sovereign immunity had not been surrendered with the
adoption of the Constitution.2 ' Although prior to Alden the Court
recognized the Eleventh Amendment as confirming the principle of
sovereign immunity, such statements served as dicta to the main
point that the Eleventh Amendment protected the right of state
sovereign immunity.25
18. The Federalist No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); 527 U.S. at 716-17, 119 S. Ct. at 2248.
19. 527 U.S. at 717-18, 119 S. Ct. at 2249.
20. 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504
(1890); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 20 S. Ct. 919 (1900); Principality of
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 54, S. Ct. 745 (1934); In re New York, 256
U.S. 490, 41 S. Ct. 588 (1921); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
21. 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890).
22. Id. at 15, 10 S. Ct. at 507; see also 527 U.S. at 728, 119 S. Ct. at 2253.
23. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
24. See, e.g., Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467 (Pa. 1798); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 54 S. Ct. 745 (1934); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
25. See, e.g., Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467 (Pa. 1798); In re State
of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S. Ct. 588 (1921); Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 54 S. Ct. 745 (1934); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
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B. The Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice Souter, reiterated his opinion in
Seminole Tribe,26 but also recognized that the majority's opinion
rendered prior Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence unnecessary.
Justice Souter argued that the majority, by relying on the Tenth
Amendment and the inherent concepts surrounding the Constitution,
eliminated the debate about the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment.27 The dissent analyzed whether sovereign immunity
existed as a principle of natural law at the time of ratification; the
dissent viewed this as the only means which supported the majority's
reasoning. Ultimately, Justice Souter concluded that sovereign
immunity had its basis in common law, not natural law. Therefore,
state sovereign immunity could be abridged by statute because it did
not inhere in the structure of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.28
The dissent pointed to numerous founders who believed that
sovereign immunity did not exist and to states which did not maintain
the right of sovereign immunity prior to ratification. 9 If, as the
94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996).
26. "[T]he Court's enhancement of the [Eleventh] Amendment was at odds
with constitutional history and at war with the conception of divided sovereignty
that is the essence of American federalism." Seminole Tribe, 527 U.S. at 760, 119
S. Ct. at 2269 (Souter, J., summarizing his position in Seminole Tribe).
27. If the Eleventh Amendment was meant to add sovereign immunity to the
Constitution then the majority's holding in Alden did not stand on historical
precedent, but rather on a new interpretation of history. If the majority was correct
in its analysis of sovereign immunity as inherent in the Constitution's history and
structure, then the Eleventh Amendment was not intended to correct any lack of
sovereign immunity in the Constitution, but was meant to be a diversity limitation
on subject matter jurisdiction in cases. The majority, however, did not reach such
a conclusion.
28. The majority rejected the dissent's implication that the majority's reasoning
was founded in natural law, stating: "[w]e do not contend the founders could not
have stripped the States of sovereign immunity... but only that they did not do
so." Id. at 734, 119 S. Ct. at 2257. The majority's contention is debatable because
their argument that sovereign immunity inhered in the Constitution lends support
to natural law roots of sovereign immunity, as the dissent pointed out. The
dissent's argument as to natural or common law roots has no relevance to the
concept of federalism. The dissent missed an opportunity to authoritatively refute
the majority's interpretation of federalism.
29. Men such as Edmund Randolph (who would later argue against the state
of Georgia in Chisholm) and Charles Pickney did not believe sovereign immunity
had been retained. Also, the four justices in Chisholm (Jay, Blair, Cushing, and
Wilson) did not believe in the inherency of sovereign immunity. James Madison
and John Marshall recognized the right, but dealt with sovereign immunity in terms
of state debt problems and did not focus on theoretical issues of natural or common
law. Id. at 775, 119 S. Ct. at 2277 (Souter, J., dissenting). The states of
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majority reasoned, sovereign immunity inhered in the national
consciousness prior to ratification, it seems they overlooked the
conflicting ideas of prominent men, most specifically the opinions of
the Justices in Chisholm. By failing to examine the majority opinion
in Chisholm, the Alden majority ignored its own premise of original
intent. The Chisholm opinion was written by men who had taken part
in the Constitutional Convention, and thus helps provide a glimpse
into the understanding of sovereign immunity at that time.3°
The dissent also rebutted the majority's argument that sovereign
immunity inhered in the concept of federalism. Relying on historical
precedent, the dissent argued that states did not retain their
sovereignty with respect to federal issues.3a McCulloch v. Maryland,
authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, further supports the
conclusion of the dissent that federalism did not provide for the
retention of state sovereign immunity because the Constitution
created a system in which each sphere of government retained
sovereignty within the bounds of its powers. 32 Essentially, the Alden
majority completely misunderstood federalism because the state of
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania did not recognize sovereign immunity
in their state constitutions. Thus, the understanding of sovereign immunity was not
as unanimous as the majority represented. Id. at 769-71, 119 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
Connecticut and Rhode Island considered themselves without immunity. This was
indicated by their adoption of colonial charters as state constitutions without
amending the suability provisions. Id. at 769, 119 S.Ct. at 2273. In 1787,
Pennsylvania had laws that permitted the Comptroller General to settle accounts.
Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was allowed ifa dispute arose over such
settlements. In 1790, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution which explicitly
gave the state legislature the authority to provide for suits against the state. Id. at
770-71, 119 S. Ct. at 2274.
30. James Wilson, prior to appointment as a Supreme CourtJustice, expressed
his opinion on state sovereign immunity vehemently at the Constitutional
Convention arguing, "the government of each state ought to be subordinate to the
government of the United States." Id. at 776, 119 S. Ct. at 2277 (citing 3 Elliot's
Debates at 490).
31. 527 U.S. at 800, 119 S. Ct. at 2288; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819). The dissent in Alden succinctly
summarized the definition of federalism with its reference to McCulloch v.
Maryland where Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "In America, the powers of
sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the
States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and
neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other" Id. at 410.
The majority throughout its opinion relied on Marshall's words at the Virginia
convention supporting the retention of state sovereign immunity. Alden, 527 U.S.
at 718, 119 S. Ct. 2249. This ignores the larger issue of federalism that Marshall
viewed as necessary to maintaining the Union. The early court under the leadership
of Chief Justice Marshall, understood the states not to retain sovereignty as to
powers granted to the federal government, and lacking sovereignty, the states could
not retain sovereign immunity as to those powers.
2001]
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Maine "[was] not sovereign with respect to... the FLSA. It [was]
not the authority that promulgated the FLSA, on which the right of
action in [that] case depends. That authority [was] the United States
"933
For the Alden majority, given the prevailing British practice of
sovereign immunity that was continued in America, the states' war
debts, and the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Constitution
did not remove from the states the right of sovereign immunity. The
Eleventh Amendment, previously understood to correct the holding
in Chisholm, under Alden expressly confirmed the concept of
sovereign immunity that the majority believed inhered in the concept
of federalism. Because the dissent disposed of the federalism issue
without elaborate discussion, an examination of the history of the
Constitution and federalism jurisprudence is necessary.
III. THE FOUNDERS' FEDERALISM
The Alden Court relied on a one sided interpretation of history to
reach its conclusion that state sovereign immunity inheres in the
Constitution. The dissent's argument that sovereign immunity
derives from common law not natural law,34 while correct, did not
point out the main problems with the majority's federalism analysis.
The majority completely ignored part of history to support the idea
of state sovereign immunity, and while invoking elements of natural
law to support its argument, focused primarily on the political and
legal history of the Constitution.
A. Historical Perspective-The Founding Generation
The Alden majority looked to state laws in existence at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, reasoning that the States did not
give up sovereign immunity unless the Constitution provided for
express surrenderof that right. The majority's analysis on this point
was incorrect for two reasons. First, the majority claimed that
sovereign immunity existed universally prior to ratification. Second,
even if all of the states did recognize the principle of sovereign
immunity, Article III, as understood by the Chisholm3 Court,
relieved states of such immunity on federal issues by listing the
instances in which the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction.
33. 527 U.S. at 800, 119 S. Ct. at 2288.
34. State sovereign immunity does not derive from natural law because
"sovereign immunity may be invoked only by the sovereign that is the source of the
right upon which suit is brought," since the sovereign is the one that makes the law
and can exempt himself from following that law. Id. at 796, 119 S. Ct. at 2286.
35. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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The majority claimed sovereign immunity existed throughout the
states at the time of ratification; however, three states3 -did not
recognize sovereign immunity. As such, this principle did not inhere
in all citizens' or states' beliefs. For those states that did not have the
right of sovereign immunity, that right remained with the people as
provided under the Tenth Amendment. a Such a system, in which
only some states could assert state sovereign immunity as to federal
law, would have rendered federal law chaotic and created a system
in which some states could disregard federal law without worrying
about suits from private citizens. The purpose of the Constitution
was to unify the country under national law, but under the majority's
analysis such unification could never have occurred.
Chisholm v. Georgia38 decided just two years after the adoption
of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, provides a clear glimpse into
the understanding of state suability in federal courts by members of
the founding generation. The Alden majority ignored the analysis of
the Chisholm Court which upheld Mr. Chisholm's right to sue the
state of Georgia for the collection of debts.a9 Instead, the Alden
majority used Justice Iredell's dissent to argue sovereign immunity
was universally accepted at the time of ratification and inhered in the
understanding of the Constitution at its adoption. This reliance on the
dissent, however, provides no evidence of sovereign immunity
inhering in the understanding of the Constitution as Justice Iredell
focused not on the Constitution, but on whether the Legislature acted
to permit suit by states.4°
If the members of the Constitutional Convention had intended to
confer immunity from federal law on states, Article III would have
explicitly granted such immunity or prevented suits against states.
36. Connecticut, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. Alden, 527 U.S. at 769-71,
119 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
37. See supra note 13.
38. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Mr. Chisholm was a citizen of South Carolina.
39. In a four to one decision, the Court, looked directly to the text ofArticle III,
and found no intent on the part of the framers to preserve sovereign immunity.
Each justice wrote a separate opinion, and of greatest importance was the
conclusion reached by each member of the majority that the Constitution did permit
suits by private citizens against a state. The majority focused on the strict language
of Article III which places "controversies, between a State and citizens of another
State," under the judicial power of the United States to determine state sovereign
immunity was not preserved by the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Of
primary importance was the Court's conclusion that the people were sovereign, and
as such the people had, through the Constitution, granted the United States judiciary
the power to hear cases involving private suits against States. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at
462,464. The Court also examined the prevailing views of Federalists and Anti-
federalists alike in concluding that the people permitted suit against a state.
40. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 429-50.
2001] NOTES 283
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Each word in the Constitution was hotly debated;4' thus, the text
should not be read to include ideas that are nowhere stated or
implied. Even if the individual states recognized sovereign immunity
prior to joining the Union, by agreeing to be bound by federal law the
states were no longer sovereign as to those powers granted to the
federal government through the Constitution.
B. Historical Perspective-British Common Law
The majority's reliance on British common law was also
misplaced as the Crown retained sovereign immunity in all courts
because the King was the only person in whom sovereignty was
vested. The creation of a federal system rendered such reliance on
common law impractical as two governments each retaining their
own separate realms of sovereignty were created. Thus, the federal
government cannot interfere in purely local matters, and states cannot
interfere or claim immunity in matters on the national level. The
states can be compared to lords or lower vassals who, while not
subject to suit in their own courts, could be sued in a higher court.
C. Historical Perspective-Federalist No. 81
The.Court repeatedly relied on Hamilton's Federalist No. 81 to
support its decision allowing states to assert sovereign immunity.42
Hamilton explicitly asserted that states did not lose sovereign
immunity under the new government because they did not
specifically give up that right through the text of the Constitution.43
Hamilton's words, read literally, clearly support the majority's
opinion that state sovereign immunity inhered in the Constitution.
This interpretation of Federalist No. 81, however, is shortsighted.44
41. 1 Alan Brinkley, et al., American History: A Survey 167 (8"' ed. 1991).
42. Alden, 527 U.S. at 716-17, 730-31, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2248, 2255 (1999).
43. Hamilton wrote: It has been suggested that an assignment of the public
securities of one State to the citizens of another would enable them to prosecute that
State in the federal courts for the amount of those securities; a suggestion which the
following considerations prove to be without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is
a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The Federalist No. 81, at
487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
44. The dissent in Seminole argued that Federalist, No. 81 "has nothing to do
with federal question cases," but rather refers to diversity jurisdiction under Article
III. The dissent relied on Hamilton's assertion "that an assignment of the public
securities of one State to the citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute
that State in the federal courts for the amount of those securities," to illustrate that
Hamilton's support of state sovereign immunity remains limited only to diversity
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Hamilton, as well as John Jay and James Madison, wrote in an attempt
to gamer support for the ratification of the Constitution, which some
feared would strip states of their sovereignty.45
Federalist No. 81, while supportive of the majority's
contention, stands as just one document in which ratification was
propagandized. Hamilton, in order to achieve ratification of the
Constitution, was attempting to allay anti-federalist fears that the new
government would be too strong.46 Also, Hamilton may have been of
the opinion that states had not given up sovereign immunity. Thus,
Federalist No. 81 might reflect Hamilton's own impression of the
Constitution, but at the time of the Constitution numerous views
existed concerning the best means of creating a workable government.
As one historian noted, the Constitutional Convention was full of
"complex, unpredictable, paradoxical" men; men who were
"compounded of rationality and irrationality, moved by selfishness and
by altruism, by love and by hate and by anger."' Any attempt to look
at the views of those men should be made with the realization that
numerous complexities surrounded the writing of the Constitution.4
In examining what the framers intended to be inherent in the
Constitution, the views of those who attended the Constitutional
Convention, the state delegates who voted to ratify the Constitution,
and works such as The Federalist Papers prove extremely useful, but
should not be examined in isolation.
In Federalist No. 81 Hamilton urged the supremacy of the
judiciary, and the creation of federal district courts. As part of his
reasoning for the creation of numerous lower federal courts throughout
the country, Hamilton argued that States should not be allowed to hear
cases involving national laws, because state judges did not have the
independence required to execute national law and the "local spirit"
may have been too prevalent for proper adjudication of federal law to
occur.4 ' Thus, Hamilton recognized the need for federal judges to hear
cases involving federal law. Although Hamilton may have opposed
state suability in 1787, in the interest of maintaining national unity
today States should not be allowed to assert sovereign immunity as a
means of avoiding the myriad of federal laws now in existence.
jurisdiction cases. 517 U.S. 44, 144-45, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1166 (citing The
Federalist No. 81, at 487).
45. Clinton Rossiter, Introduction, in The Federalist Papers vii-xvi (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)
46. Id.at481.
47. Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89, at 134 (1992).
48. For example, Federalist No. 81 also refers specifically to the collection of
debts. The Federalist No. 81, at 488. Arguably, it reflects the Founders' fear of a
rush by individuals to collect debts from states which would destabilize the infant
American economy.
49. Id. at 486.
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D. The Eleventh Amendment
Congress reacted to the ruling in Chisholm by passing the
Eleventh Amendment in 1794 and sending it to the states for
ratification.5" The Alden majority's contention that the Eleventh
Amendment merely confirmed the principle of sovereign immunity
that inhered in the Constitution provided only one historical
perspective of the ratification of that Amendment. Contrary to the
belief of the Alden majority, the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment indicates that states did not understand sovereign
immunity to inhere in the Constitution. Two days after the Chisholm
decision Senator Caleb Strong drafted a version of the Eleventh
Amendment." Senator Strong's draft closely resembled the text of
the Eleventh Amendment, but the change from the draft to the final
version lends support to the argument that the Eleventh Amendment
did not grant sovereign immunity to the states as the initial draft
prevented suit by any person whether a citizen or foreigner against
any state.52  Strong deleted the phrase preventing suit "by any
foreign State or by any Individual or Individuals whether Citizens or
Foreigners," in the proposal he submitted to Congress. 3 This
purposeful omission indicates that suit could be commenced against
a state under federal law by a state's own citizens. This proposal
also never came to a vote. However, in the next session Congress
passed his proposal that had been resubmitted with only minor
changes54 and by the next year, 1795, the Eleventh Amendment
50. The year delay between the Chisholm decision and the passage of the
Eleventh Amendment resulted not from political opposition, but from an
amendment to the bill that excluded all holders of the Bank of the United States
from membership in Congress. This amendment would have resulted in the
exclusion of approximately twenty percent of the Congress. The proposing
Congressman, however, erroneously thought the bill was so popular that it would
pass anyway. William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The
Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 198 (1995).
51. The previous day Congressman Theodore Sedgwick proposed the first draft
of the Eleventh Amendment which provided that no state could be made a
defendant by any person or entity. This draft never came to a vote. Id. at 197.
52. The full text of Strong's initial proposal provided: The Judicial Power of
the United States shall not extend to any Suits in Law or Equity commenced or
prosecuted by any foreign State or by any Individual or Individuals whether
Citizens or Foreigners, against any one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State. Id.
53. Thus the proposal Senator Strong presented to Congress in 1793 provided:
"The Judicial Power of the United States shall not extend to any Suits in Law or
Equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State." Id.
54. Strong added the words "be construed to." Id.
[Vol. 62286
NOTES
became part of the Constitution, upon ratification by three-fourths
of the states."
The passage of the Eleventh Amendment provided supporters of
state sovereign immunity an opportunity to insure that future
generations would understand that state sovereign immunity had not
been lost upon entry into the Union. But these supporters did not
take such action. The Alden majority did not deal with the passage
of the Eleventh Amendment, but presumably could have argued that
the drafters thought sovereign immunity apparent. However, this
argument is flawed because the Chisholm Court ignored state
sovereign immunity as to foreign citizens. Thus, Congress, in
prohibiting suits against states by non-citizens, could have also
prevented suits against states by their own citizens. Congress did not
act, and their silence, given the circumstances, should be understood
to have confirmed state suability under federal law. The Eleventh
Amendment only narrowly overturns Chisholm as to diversity
jurisdiction, it does not overturn the idea that a suit may be brought
against a state by its citizen under federal law.16
55. See supra note 4.
56. Further evidence regarding the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment is
found in Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467 (1798), where the Court
rejected a petition brought by a British subject against Pennsylvania to have his
criminal suit removed to federal court. The Court in Respublica wrote that the
Eleventh Amendment settled the issue of state suability. This case, though, did not
establish the precedent that the Eleventh Amendment granted states absolute
sovereign immunity. However, its language did provide ammunition for supporters
ofstate sovereign immunity, as the Court wrote, "[W]hen the judicial law [Eleventh
Amendment] was passed, the opinion prevailed that States might be sued, which by
this Amendment is settled otherwise." Id. at 475. When read out of context the
Court's words indicate the Eleventh Amendment granted sovereign immunity to the
states. Respublica, while seemingly supportive of state sovereign immunity,
actually highlights flaws in the Alden majority's reasoning. The Respublica Court
asserted that the prevailing opinion in the country from 1787 to 1795 (when the
Eleventh Amendment was passed) permitted suits against states in federal court.
Also, Respublica dealt with a British subject suing a state which the Eleventh
Amendment clearly prohibits. Thus, the sovereign immunity referred to in
Respublica should only be interpreted to encompass suits brought by foreigners
against a state, and not to suits brought against a state by its own citizens. The
Alden majority also refers to Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890),
to support its holding that a private citizen cannot sue a state for violations of
federal law. In Hans a citizen of Louisiana brought suit in Federal Court against
Louisiana in an attempt to collect payment of coupons on state bonds which had
become due in 1880. A unanimous Court held the state to be immune to suits
brought by its own citizens. Of historical importance to the discussion in Hans is
the concurrence of Justice Harlan who wrote that Chisholm "was based upon a
sound interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was." Id. at 21, 10
S. Ct. at 509. Harlan understood the Eleventh Amendment to alter the Constitution,
overturn Chisholm, and confer a right of sovereign immunity on the states. While
the Alden majority gave great weight to Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm,
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IV. MODERN FEDERALISM
In recent jurisprudence the Court summarized the structure of
government succinctly, stating that the founders had "split the atom
of sovereignty."57  The Constitution sought to create a union
composed of multiple independent states united under national law.
Under this scheme of government the states retained sovereign
immunity under state law unless consent to suit was given through
the state legislature. In matters of federal law, however, consent to
suit was given upon entry into the Union. The Constitution created
a system whereby states consented to give up certain powers to join
the Union in return for the benefits that unity provides.5" The
sovereignty of the states remained only for state matters; the
Constitution and federal law superseded state authority for national
concerns.
A. The Civil War
By relying heavily on the history surrounding the adoption of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Alden majority rendered a
holding incompatible with the current state of American government.
The majority relied on thoughts two centuries removed, and failed to
recognize the dramatic change the United States has undergone since
the Civil War. Until 1861, the Constitution served to protect the
individual from the federal government. The view that state
governments were best able to protect their citizens was firmly
entrenched in the minds of the American people as evidenced by the
Court's ruling inBarron v. Mayor ofBaltimore.59 The Civil War, and
Justice Harlan's concurrence was not included as part of the historical analysis of
the Eleventh Amendment. The Alden Court asserted the importance of historical
analysis, but ignored contrary analysis that could have refuted their holding that the
principle of sovereign immunity inhered in the Constitution. Harlan's short opinion
in Hans provides credibility for the argument that the Court should now interpret
the Eleventh Amendment as a clarification of Article III subject matter jurisdiction.
57. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1872
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). "[S]plitting the atom of sovereignty" refers to the
idea that the Constitution created a society composed of two separate sovereigns.
The United States, as the dissent in Alden noted, successfully, "repudiated the
received political wisdom that a system of multiple sovereignties constituted the
'great solecism of an imperium in imperio."' Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 799, 119 S. Ct.
2240, 2287 (1999) (citation omitted).
58. Such benefits, for example, include the building of interstate roads,
protection from invasion, stability of economy, the post office, and freedom from
internal tariffs. The states learned from the chaos of the Articles of Confederation
that without a stronger national government the Confederation would not survive.
59. 32 U.S. 243 (1833). Barron sued the city of Baltimore alleging the city
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the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment shortly thereafter, changed
the balance between state and federal governments.
The Fourteenth Amendment was the "centerpiece" of a "new
structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era."6 ° This
structure of law recognized that the states were incapable of
protecting the basic right of individuals and as such the federal
government assumed that role. The Court noted in 1972 that
following the Civil War "the role of the Federal Government as a
guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly
established."6 Ultimately, the inability of Southern states to protect
their citizens' rights necessitated the passage of the Civil War
Amendments, and created an alteration in the balance of government.
Congress, in passing the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, as the Court later observed, "clearly conceived that it
was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with
respect to the protection of federally created rights."62
deprived him of his Fifth Amendment property right. The city's public works
improvements caused the Baltimore harbor water level to drop, thus ships could not
reach Barron's wharf, rendering the wharfvalueless. Barron wanted compensation
for this taking of property absent due process. The Supreme Court held the Fifth
Amendment applicable only to the federal government, stating that individuals had
to look to their state constitutions for protection from state governments.
60. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 92 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 (1972).
Mitchum, an individual, brought suit against the state of Florida in federal court for
the closure of his bookstore under state proceedings. Mitchum relied on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1972), the federal civil rights statute, permitting suits in equity or other
proper proceeding to redress "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution" under color of state law. The issue before the Court
was whether the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1972), prohibited the
federal courts from granting relief in state court proceedings. The Court held 42
U.S.C. § 1983 expressly authorized federal court relief, and thus was an exception
to the anti-injunction statute.
61. Id. It would take more than half a century before the Court recognized this
shift, as the Court sharply curtailed incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the
privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
The Supreme Court did not recognize the extension of the Bill of Rights to the
States until 1925. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925). This
began the berry-picking process of rights that has brought about the incorporation
of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Ironically, in the first session of
Congress in 1789, Madison introduced an amendment thatprovided, "No state shall
violate the equal rights of conscience,.or the freedom of the press, or the trial by
jury in criminal cases." Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from
the First Federal Congress 13 (Helen E. Veit, et al. eds.,199 1). Madison believed
this amendment necessary to insure the protection of individuals from state
governments, as some states had no Bill of Rights, while others did not adequately
protect citizens. Had this amendment been adopted, citizens would have benefitted
from greater protection of their individual rights.
62. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242, 92 S. Ct. at 2162. The Court continued,
"[Congress] was concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those
rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication
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B: The Seventeenth Amendment
The twentieth century has seen the necessary expansion of the
national government commencing with the Food and Drug
Administration, continuing with federal programs that provided jobs,
security, and improved infrastructure during the Great Depression,
and culminating in the Civil Rights Acts. In each of these instances,
Congress acted pursuant to its Interstate Commerce Clause powers,
and in doing so assisted millions of Americans whose states had
failed to protect them. No one in 1787 could have contemplated the
vast expansion the American government has undergone during the
last century, but simply because this change was not contemplated
does not mean the founders would disapprove. The Constitution
ought to be interpreted in light of contemporary needs. Such
interpretation does not change the Constitution, but rather insures that
the Constitution will remain viable to generations of Americans.
In 1913 the Constitution was altered to provide for the direct
election of the United States Senate with the adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment.63 Several have argued this change upset
the balance between the State and the Federal governments,
disturbing the careful system of checks and balances created by the
Constitution.64  The Constitution's requirement that the state
legislatures elect their Senators insured the states a voice in the
operation of the national government, and served to protect the states
from an overreaching central government.65 Delegates to the 1787
Constitutional Convention voiced two different reasons for requiring
of those rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts." Id.
63. The Seventeenth Amendment provides in pertinent part, "The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the
people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote." U.S. Const.
amend. XVII, cl. 1. This alters Article I, Section 3, clause 1 which provided, "The
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one
Vote."
64. Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens'
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500 (1997) [hereinafter
Bybee]; C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the
Seventeenth Amendment (1995) [hereinafter Hoebeke]; David E. Kyvig, Explicit
and Authentic Acts, Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995, at 478 (1996);
Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the
Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 671 (1999)
[hereinafter Rossum].
65. Bybee, supra note 64, at 504 (citing The Federalist No. 62, at 378 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) ("The equal vote allowed to each state, is
at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual states, and the instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty").
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the election of Senators by the state legislature. Some delegates
sought this form of election of Senators as they believed it would
create a more refined, cautious, aristocratic body of men, and thus
represent America's wealth.66 Alternatively, others thought election
of the Senate by the state legislatures created a check on the national
government as states had a direct role in the election of one house of
Congress.67 In 1787 both of these reasons had validity, as
government was believed to be for those who were independently
wealthy, and America's elite feared too much democracy. '
Although members of the Constitutional Convention intended the
indirect election of Senators to serve as a check on federal power and
a means for the states to protect their interests, 69 by the twentieth
century this seemed unnecessary. The corruption associated with
indirect election and the belief that America should move closer
towards democracy increased the desire of the people to have a
popularly elected Senate.7 ° In 1912, Congress passed the Seventeenth
Amendment and sent it to the States for ratification, which occurred
less than a year later. With the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, Senators became accountable directly to the people
rather than political bosses, or state legislatures.
71
Multiple authors argue the direct election of Senators represents
a dramatic shift in the structure of the federal government. If the
States had utilized the Senate more actively perhaps this would be
true. Also, the States consented to the relinquishment of any power
they exercised through the indirect election of.Senators by ratifying
the Seventeenth Amendment. On a more basic level though, the
purpose of the Senate, even prior to ihe direct election of Senators,
66. Bybee, supra note 64, at 510.
67. Id. at 510-11.
68. This fear of democratic excesses as well as a need for the State to balance
national interests is also reflected in the creation of the electoral college which
provides that the electors choose the President and requires: Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person
.holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an
Elector. U.S. Const. art. II § 1, cl. 2.
69. Bybee, supra note 64, at 510-11.
70. In addition to the multiple Senators who were found to have bribed state
legislators in order to reach the Senate, the corruption of machine politics also
fueled the movement for direct election of Senators. Hoebeke, supra note 64, at 91,
97, 98.
71. Madison's fear of the excesses of democracy proved true as the direct
election of Senators permitted demagogues, such as Huey Long and Joseph
McCarthy, not popular with the political machine but with the voters, the right to
a Senate seat. Hoebeke, supra note 64 at 190.
72. Bybee, supra note 64; Hoebeke, supra note 64, at 478; Rossum, supra note
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had been to represent the people of their state. Thus, the Seventeenth
Amendment made Senators directly accountable to the people of the
State, rather than the state legislatures.
The House of Representatives and the Senate differ with respect
to the people represented. Representatives serve the people of their
district whose interests on the national level could differ widely from
the interests of constituents in another district within the same state.
Senators are charged with the duty of representing the collective
interests of the people of their state. Thus, even with popular election
of Senators the interests of States are served because what is in the
interest of the people of the State is in the interest of the State.
C. Expanding the Federal Government
New Deal legislation forced the dramatic enlargement of the
federal government experienced under the leadership of a determined
President and a Congress who recognized its duty to work for the
citizens. An argument could be made that, had indirect election of
Senators remained, the Senate never would have approved the
expansion of the federal government through the interstate commerce
clause. This argument bears little merit because the people,
frustrated with the inaction of their Senators, would elect state
legislators willing to vote for Senators who would alleviate the
problems of the Great Depression.73 Although such a process would
take longer, inevitably the outcome would have remained the same.
Also, by the twentieth century, Senators did not necessarily follow
the directives of the state legislatures, nor did most state legislatures
take an active role in instructing their Senators.74 The Court
eventually acceded to this use of the interstate commerce clause to
enact federal legislation that impacted local interests.75 Thus, Article
73. This assumes a majority of the States were against aid from the federal
government to deal with the Great Depression, and there is no evidence to indicate
the States were alarmed by the activism of the federal government, especially
because the programs restored the confidence of the American people and
alleviated some problems.
74. Bybee, supra note 64, at 527.
75. The Court initially found some ofthe New Deal programs unconstitutional.
President Roosevelt threatened to push through legislation that would enlarge the
size of the Supreme Court, and permit him to appoint Justices sympathetic to his
ideology. The Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel, 301 U.S. 1,57 S. Ct. 615 (1937), reversed its priorjurisprudence and rejected
the claim that the National Labor Relations Act preventing unfair labor practices,
"invad[ed] the reserved powers of the States over their local concerns," in response
to Roosevelt's court packing plan. Id. at 29, 57 S. Ct. at 620. The Court held that
Congress had the power to regulate such activity through the interstate commerce
clause because it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court in
1942 extended the reach of the interstate commerce clause holding that the
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I breathed new life into the federal government that was
unimaginable to the founders, but nevertheless in conformity with the
Constitution.76
New Deal programs forced enlargement of Congress' interstate
commerce power, expanding Article I jurisdiction and paving the
way for the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts" a quarter-century
later. The Civil Rights Acts illustrate the necessary expansion of the
federal government to protect American citizens' fundamental rights
to life, liberty and property, both from state abuse and other citizens.
The Fourteenth Amendment78 served as the rallying call of the Civil
Rights movement, but without the interstate commerce clause racial
discrimination by non-state actors would not have been subject to
federal intervention. The Court readily endorsed the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States79and Katzenbach v. McClung ° finding that
Agricultural Adjustment Act setting quotas on wheat sold intrastate, interstate, and
consumed on the farm in which it was raised was constitutional. Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942). In Wickard the Court held that
Congress has the power to regulate this activity because something local, even if
it is not commerce can be regulated if it has an effect on interstate commerce.
There, the plaintiff had a small farm where all wheat grown was consumed on the
farm. The Court held this affected interstate commerce because if all individuals
took such action then the amount of wheat sold interstate would diminish, thus
adversely effecting interstate commerce. Id.
76. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (Civil Rights Act of 1957); 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (Civil
Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Voting Rights Act of 1965).
78. The Fourteenth Amendment is dealt with here as it relates to the expansion
of Congressional power. Fourteenth Amendment sovereign immunity issues have
not been discussed as the focus of the paper is Article I. Fourteenth Amendment
state sovereign immunity is treated under a different line of case law since the states
expressly surrendered sovereign immunity to Congress, whereas under Article I
such surrender is only implied. Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
may explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity to insure state compliance with
the Fourteenth Amendment. The states ratified this Amendment with full
knowledge of their surrender of state sovereign immunity as to those issues falling
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
79. 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348 (1964). The Court held a hotel in downtown
Atlanta, bordering two interstate highways, could not refuse service to African-
Americans. Seventy-five percent of their customers were from out of state, and the
hotel solicited business through the national media. Congress' enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 preventing such racial discrimination was a valid use of
its interstate commerce clause power because interstate commerce existed both
before and after people visited the hotel. The Court wrote, "[t]he power of
Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the
local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and
destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that
commerce." Id. at 258, 85 S. Ct. at 358.
80. 379 U.S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377 (1964). Ollie's Barbeque in Birmingham, a
white restaurant with a take out window for African-Americans, far from the
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the activities in each effected interstate commerce, and citing as
precedent the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Filburn. Without
Wickard the Court may have been less likely to find attenuated
effects on interstate commerce susceptible to federal jurisdiction due
to the divisive political atmosphere stemming from racial prejudices.
D. Reconciling Expansion with the Constitution
Although the current structure of American federalism does not
resemble that designed more than two centuries ago, each
government still fulfills its function as a protector of the people.
The federal government serves to protect the people from the states
and represent the people's interest as a nation. The state
governments have a duty to protect their people from an
overreaching federal government and fulfill the local needs of their
constituents. While the Constitution in 1787 contemplated the
federal and state governments competing against each other in an
effort to balance their powers, such a protection is no longer
necessary to the current scheme of government. The federal and
state governments still remain sovereign with respect to their
different powers, and by retaining this sovereignty protect the
interests of the people. The federal government protects citizens
through the Supremacy Clause, insuring uniform application of
federal law. The states protect the people through Congress,
specifically the Senate, as each Senator represents the citizens of their
state, not just the people of one district. The people are the State and
by creating a body that represents the people as a state, the balance
of power remains. If the citizens believe the federal government has
encroached upon their local interests, then the democratic process,
i.e., election, permits citizens to check the federal government.
Americans in 1787 embarked upon an experiment in creating the
Constitution. A republican form of government represented a sharp
departure from the monarchies of Great Britain and the rest of
Europe, thus, the Founder's desire to balance the government
stemmed from the world's inexperience with democracy.8 A
highway with no real out of state business fell within Title II of the Civil Rights
Act. Half the food bought by Ollie's from an in state supplier originated from an
out of state supplier. The Court held Congress had the power to regulate Ollie's
and businesses similarly situated, because Congress "had a rational basis for finding
that racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free
flow of interstate commerce." Id. at 304, 85 S. Ct. at 384. This restaurant's
conduct was representative of similar conduct throughout the country which had an
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.
81. "For the adoption of the Constitution made [the States] members of a novel
federal system that sought to balance the States' exercise of some sovereign
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republic, rather than a democracy was created; however, the
Constitution left room for democratic evolution by providing a
process for amending the Constitution. The Fourteenth and
Seventeenth Amendments illustrate such an evolution. To rely solely
on the Constitution as conceived in 1787 ignores the societal,
technological, and legal advances the United States has made over
more than two centuries.
V. BEYOND "ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY" 
82
The Supreme Court in Alden moved the issue of state sovereign
immunity from the Eleventh Amendment to the text of the
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment. Effectively, removal of
state sovereign immunity from Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
leaves only Article III jurisdictional issues to that Amendment.
However, basing state sovereign immunity on the text of the
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment causes problems for the
Supremacy Clause, and indicates the willingness to use that
Amendment as a vehicle for voicing states rights' ideology.
A. Supremacy Clause
The Court rendered the Supremacy Clause 3 useless for those
citizens who seek to enforce federal law against non-compliant
states." As to rights of private citizens against states for failure to
follow state law, there exists no reason for passing a law if states
have no incentive to follow it. The ruling in Alden essentially brings
the country back to a confederation type of government. If the
Supreme Court may not entertain cases involving private suits against
states under federal law then a large portion of federal law potentially
remains unenforceable. Congress should not be permitted to act
beyond its Article I powers, but the Court, by sustaining state
prerogatives delegated from their own people with the principle of a limited but
centralizing federal supremacy." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 150, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1169 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. This term used in referring to states' immunity from suits, while
"convenient shorthand," is according to the Alden Court incorrect. '[T]he
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,713, 119 S. Ct. 2240,
2246 (1999).
83. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding. U.S. Const. art. VI.
84. The federal government may still institute suit against a non-compliant
state, thus citizens are not left completely unprotected.
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sovereign immunity, permits states to violate validly enacted federal
laws with no consequences. Although the majority in Alden
contended that the people could rely on the good faith of the state in
following federal laws, this does not solve the problem of what
remedies are available to individuals if the state violates federal law.
Also, it seems impractical to expect the Justice Department to sue a
state on behalf of an individual whenever a state violates federal law.
A potential remedy to the lapse of enforcement of federal law
over states created by Alden would require suits to be brought by the
Justice Department on behalf of large numbers of individuals
adversely affected by non-compliant states. This scheme, however,
causes problems for individuals as well as states. Adequate
protection of individuals would not be guaranteed because enough
people would have to be injured in order for the Justice Department
to find it worthwhile to bring suit.85 States, potentially, would be
subject to greater liability in a suit brought by the federal
government. The effect on a state treasury due to a large verdict or
settlement in one of these suits could deplete the state budget. Also,
the state has a diminished ability to reach a compromise because the
federal government would be seeking to protect the collective
interests of the affected individuals. In private suits, there exists a
greater possibility of compromise as the individual seeks
compensation, whereas the federal government has a punitive
interest.8 6  The federal government acts as an agent for those
individuals harmed by a non-compliant state, thus the state cannot
completely avoid suit. The Alden Court upsets the balance of
government by upholding the principle of state sovereign immunity,
leaving the States their dignity, but ignoring the purpose of federal
law as a means of protecting individuals.
The Supremacy Clause embodies the principle of American
federalism, as it declares federal law to be above all other. States
cannot override federal law, but instead are bound by the work of the
national government. Bracton's maxim, cited by the Chisholm Court
concisely summarizes the role of the Supremacy Clause within the
nature of federalism: "[i]t would be superfluous to make laws, unless
85. Also, this could lead to the enlargement of the executive office depending
on the President's policy. A President concerned with such issues would enlarge
the Justice Department, thus upsetting the balance of power between the three
branches of government. Thus, the Alden majority concerned with maintaining a
proper balance between federal and state governments, upsets the system of checks
and balances within the federal system by forcing the enlargement of the executive
branch.
86. The federal government has as its interest insuring federal law remains the
supreme law, and may be less likely to compromise with a state who defies federal
law.
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those laws, when made, were to be enforced.""7 Alden undermines
the authority of Congress to make laws. Although the majority
argued their decision did not give states the right to disregard federal
law, this assertion causes problems since it certainly does not provide
any incentive for states to comply with federal law. 8 Prior
jurisprudence recognized that where "a federal statute does impose
liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the
law in every State, fully enforceable in state court."89 Thus, by
permitting the assertion of state sovereign immunity on a federal law
claim, the majority in Alden clearly ignored its prior regard for the
Supremacy Clause and removed state liability to citizens under
federal law.
B. Tenth Amendment Implications
The majority in Alden brushed over the implications that their
decision has on Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Members of the
Chisholm Court utilized the Tenth Amendment in order to
demonstrate the sovereignty of the people, but not to recognize
retention of state sovereign immunity. If the Court today invokes
history to support its contention that state sovereign immunity inheres
in the nature of the Constitution, more weight should be given'to the
reasoning of the majority in Chisholm, particularly their
understanding of the Tenth Amendment.
Through the Constitution the people granted certain rights to the
federal government in order to create a strong and stable country.
Since the people acted through their states in granting these powers,
all those powers not specifically conferred through the Constitution
remained with the States (as enunciated in the Tenth Amendment).
Also, in utilizing history, the majority in Alden, neglected to account
for the addition of the Bill of Rights as a political persuasion tool
intended to insure ratification by the states with a large anti-federalist
contingency. These anti-federalists did not think separation of
powers an adequate means of protecting against a tyrannical national
government.
90
The Court in recent cases relied on the Tenth Amendment to
assert the need for the protection of states in their capacity as
87. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 464 (1793).
88. Even Madison, as he and the country aged, recognized the need to protect
the national government from Constitutional imbalance. Edward McNall Bums,
James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution 157 (1938). In Alden, the Court
tipped the scale in favor of state governments against the national government.
89. Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,207, 112
S. Ct. 560, 566 (1991).
90. Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89, at 155 (1992).
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sovereign states.9' The Tenth Amendment provides for the retention
of sovereignty in the people, and the protection of the people occurs
through the political process. The people remain sovereign as they
retain ultimate power to approve or disapprove of actions taken by
Congress or the President. The Court assumes a dangerous role by
relying on states' rights ideology to restrain the federal government.
By protecting the states, the Court ignores the purpose of the
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment as a protector of the people
from any unlawful government encroachment. A balanced
government is necessary to insure protection of individuals, not to
insure the protection of states, and the Court in its effort to protect
states' rights ignores the ultimate source of sovereignty, the people.
C. Practical Considerations
Although the debate over state sovereign immunity exists on a
historical and philosophical level, Alden impacts a broad range of
issues relating to everyday Americans' lives. As seen in Alden, state
employees had no means of seeking redress against Maine for its
violation of the FLSA's overtime provision. Alden also renders
citizens unable to sue states on intellectual property disputes, reverses
Union Gas, and causes numerous problems in other areas of law. 92
In matters of intellectual property Alden creates an array of
problems that could stifle development of innovative ideas and
products. Such problems could arise, for example, in cases where a
professor's research conclusions are sold by his university with no
compensation to the professor for his work. If the university is a
private entity, the professor seeks relief in court to recover the
profits the university made from the sale of his work. If the
professor is employed by a state university, however, he cannot
recover the loss he suffered as a result of the university selling his
ideas because, under Alden, states are immune from private suits
brought for infringement of federal intellectual property law.93 The
91. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365; United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
92. See, e.g. Kenneth Klee, et al., State Defiance of Bankruptcy Law, 52 Vand.
L. Rev. 1527 (1999); Practice Note, 1999 Army Law. 52 (Aug. 1999) (discusses the
implications ofAlden on the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act). Also, those laws enacted pursuant to Congress' § 5, Fourteenth
Amendment powers such as the "Americans with Disabilities Act" and the "Age
Discrimination in Employment Act" are rendered inapplicable to the states. See
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); Erickson v.
Bd. of Gov., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000); Davis v. Utah Tax Commission, 96 F.
Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2000).
93. College Sav. Bankv. Florida PrepaidPost-Secondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527
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Court's recent jurisprudence essentially authorizes state theft of
intellectual property as the victims have no federal remedy available
to discourage the state from taking such action. Thus, the holding
in Alden coupled with the Florida Prepaid cases leaves individuals
defenseless against the state, and threatens development of novel
ideas.
The Court in Union Gas recognized the importance of permitting
a private suit against a state in matters of national concern.94 Those
problems national in nature require uniform remedial measures.
Through CERCLA, Congress made everyone, including states,
potentially liable for the costs of hazardous waste cleanup. The
enormous cleanup costs necessitated such broad measures because
the federal government could not shoulder the costs or the time for
all hazardous waste cleanups. Congress, as a means of encouraging
cleanup, allowed those entities partly responsible for hazardous
waste sites that voluntarily cleaned up those sites to sue other
potentially responsible parties for recovery of a portion of the
cleanup costs. The States "comprise[d] a significant class of
owners and operators of hazardous waste sites." 6 Rendering the
States immune from suits by private citizens would defeat the
motivation of private citizens to shoulder the responsibility of
hazardous waste cleanup, and stifle the ability of Congress to deal
with the problem of hazardous waste.
VI. CONCLUSION
Private suits against states can only arise on federal question
issues,9" thus state sovereign immunity gained increasing relevance
with the expansion of federal legislation. Prior to Seminole,98 a state
U.S. 666, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Ed. Expense Bd.
v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
94. The plurality recognized that the "problem of environmental harm is often
not susceptible of a local solution." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
20, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2285 (1989).
95. Id. at 21-22, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
96. Id. at 22, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
97. Although debate exists as to the breadth of state suability under the
Eleventh Amendment there exists no dispute that it prevents suit against a state on
diversity jurisdiction grounds, as it prohibits suits "against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State." U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Union Gas, 491
U.S. at 23-24, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286-87 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Seminole overruled Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989), which permitted Congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity through the Interstate Commerce Clause,
so long as Congress expressed a clear intent to do so. Seminole involved suit by the
Seminole Indians against the state of Florida and its governor for failure to comply
with the good faith negotiations provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
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alleged to have violated federal law could be privately sued in federal
court.99  Seminole and Alden provide no relief under federal
legislation to a citizen injured by a state unless the federal
government decides to intervene.
Given the holding in Seminole, the Court's ruling in Alden came
as no surprise because if a state could not be sued in federal court on
federal law then a state would also not be amenable to suit in its own
courts on issues of federal law. The ruling in Seminole, however, left
the petitioners in Alden with no alternative but to seek redress in their
own state courts. Alden did not require the majority to rely on issues
of federalism and the inherency of sovereign immunity, as simple
reasoning provides the same outcome. If a state was not found to
have consented to suit in federal court, it would not be found to have
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1996). Id. at 47; 116 S. Ct. at 1119. Congress passed the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act pursuant to its Article I, Indian Commerce Clause
powers. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3. Section 2710(d)(7) of the Act explicitly
authorized suits against states who failed to comply with the good faith
requirement. Seminole, 517 U.S. at47, 116 S. Ct. at 1119. The Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from exercising its Article I powers to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
99. The Court in the years following Hans did broaden the reach of state
sovereign immunity by going beyond the literal words of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court found it improper to leave a state open to suits in admiralty, just as it had
been unacceptable to allow private suits against a state in federal court. In re State
of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S. Ct. 588 (1921). Relying on the necessity of
consent for a state to be sued, the Court ignored the reference of the Eleventh
Amendment to "suits in law or equity," and extended immunity to admiralty suits.
Id. The Court in the next decade held that "the 'entirejudicial power granted by the
Constitution' does not embrace authority to entertain such suits in the absence of
the State's consent." Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,329, 54
S. Ct. 745 (1934). InEdelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974), the
Court used the Eleventh Amendment to bar the federal court from awarding
retroactive payment of benefits found to have been wrongfully withheld by the
state.
However, the precedent leading to Union Gas also indicates the surrender
of sovereignty, and thus the surrender of sovereign immunity by the states with the
ratification of the Constitution. InParden v. TerminalRailway, 377 U.S. 184, 192,
84 S. Ct. 1207, 1212 (1964), the Court held that by empowering "Congress to
regulate commerce .... the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their
sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation." In Employees v.
Missouri Pub. Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 93 S. Ct. 1614 (1973), the Court
concluded that Congress had authority to override state claims of immunity when
acting pursuant to Commerce Clause powers. The Court in subsequent cases
upheld the authority of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it
validly exercised its Article I powers. Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York, 470 U.S. 226, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985). Thus, Union Gas
reflected the concept that by ratifying the Constitution, the states consented to
Congressional authority for Article I powers, and Article I by its existence
permitted Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
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consented to suit in its own court on federal law. This result occurs
because in their constitutions states expressly consent to suits, and if
a state argues it has not consented to suit on federal law in federal
court, then practically the state will not have made itself amenable to
suit in state courts on federal law. The state will not argue state
sovereign immunity in federal court if it can be sued in state court
under the same law. States invoke state sovereign immunity as a
means of dismissing a suit, not as a means of removing the suit to
their own court. The inability to sue a state rejects principles of
federalism, as it leaves citizens unprotected from the state
governments. The majority opinions in Seminole and Alden while
purporting to uphold the principles of the founders, with their
reasoning undermined the concept of American government.
The Court, in dealing with sovereign immunity, should focus on
what action is being taken against that state, and whether Congress
has the constitutional authority to enact such legislation under Article
I or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state should not be
immune from federal law simply because it is a state. The
Constitution created a federal system in which states surrendered
their power as to those issues enunciated in the Constitution. The
extent of the federal government's powers under the Constitution
remained susceptible to expanding or shrinking interpretations.
Article I provides clear Congressional authority on all matters falling
within that Article. This implies that upon entry into the Union the
states ceded any Article I powers they had to the federal government,
thus relinquishing sovereign immunity as to Article I provisions.
This surrender occurred in full compliance with the principles of
federalism as understood by members of the founding generation as
well as modem America.
The majority in Alden only further removes American citizens'
ability to seek redress against a non-compliant state. Alden indicates
the Supreme Court's desire to expand state power at the expense of
the federal government and, ultimately, the people. The dissent
missed the opportunity to refute the flawed logic of the majority, and
redeem modem federalism. Theoretically, the states being closer to
the people should be best able to protect its citizens, however,
modem history has shown otherwise. The Constitution created a
government in which states granted certain powers to the federal
government; implicit in the granting of such powers was the inability
of states to claim sovereign immunity as the states were no longer
sovereign as to these powers. The Court ultimately is substituting its
own opinion for that of Congress, and the Constitution did not intend
the judiciary to sit as super legislature. The Court, by ignoring its




The Eleventh Amendment neither confirmed nor introduced the
idea of state sovereign immunity, but rather served as a rule for
diversity cases in federal courts.' °° The language of the Eleventh
Amendment, given the decisions exercised by its drafters, should be
read literally. The broad interpretation the Court gives to state
sovereign immunity undermines the concept of federalism and the
Constitution. It elevates the states to an equal immune footing with
the federal government in matters that are within the realm of federal
jurisdiction leaving the citizens powerless to defend themselves from
the abuses of state government.
Sarah Louise House*
100. One author has commented that the reason for the Eleventh Amendment
was to prevent foreign countries, specifically Great Britain, from suing debtor
states. This would have weakened the states. John E. Nowak, The Scope of
Congressional Power to Create Causes ofAction Against State Governments and
the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1413(1975).
* The author wishes to thank Professor Howard L'Enfant for his guidance and
insight during the preparation of this article.
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